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ARGUMENT
I. Even With Defendants' Counterclaim Dismissed, the Trial Court
Still Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing Plaintiffs Case for Failure to
Prosecute.
Defendants' counsel correctly points out that in the trial court's Order dated March
30,2000 and entered on March 31,2000 the Defendants' counterclaim was dismissed by
the trial court. However, even with the Defendants' counterclaim dismissed, the trial court
still abused its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs case for failure to prosecute where
neither party pursued this case for nearly one year.
In analyzing any dismissal for failure to prosecute, the five factors must be
considered: (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move
the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side by the party's delay; and (5),
most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779
P.2d 237 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) citing K.L.C. Inc. v.
McLean. 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) and Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1977). The trial court's discretion in determining whether to dismiss for failure to
prosecute "'must be balanced against' the priority of'affording disputants an opportunity
to be heard and to do justice between them.'" Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 106, ^f 28,
46 P.3d 753, quoting Maxfield. 779 P.2d at 239 and Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v.
Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 554 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). Even without
i
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considering the Defendants' counterclaim, the trial court still abused its discretion in
dismissing the Plaintiffs case.
a.

The conduct, opportunity and accomplishments of both parties.

The first three Maxfield factors requires this Court to examine each party's actions
or inactions, the opportunity each party had to move the case along, as well as the overall
conduct of the parties. In reviewing both the Defendants5 and the Plaintiffs actions, it
appears that substantial discovery occurred throughout this case, albeit before the
Plaintiffs appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in 2000. This extensive discovery process
included the Plaintiff taking numerous depositions in California, as well as many written
discovery requests, which were subject to several motions to compel. Indeed, at the July
8,2002 hearing before Judge Claudia Laycock, Plaintiffs counsel stated "there is a lot of
discovery that was done almost five years ago..." (Brief of Appellees, Exhibit E, p. 6).
Thus, both parties completed substantial discovery before the Plaintiff s appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court in 2000. In interpreting the corresponding federal rule, some courts may
excuse a delay in prosecuting an action when the plaintiff has been otherwise diligent.
Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1986). In the present action, the
Plaintiff has been diligently pursuing her claim for several years, and a nearly one year
delay should not cause her entire claim to be dismissed.
The Defendants attempt to portray the time incurred in the appeals process as
further delay of Plaintiff prosecuting her case. However, federal courts have also found
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that only delay which are attributable to the plaintiff should be considered in deciding a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 312, 317 (5th
Cir. 1982).
While this case was filed in 1996, a motion for summary judgment was granted in
June, 1998. During that time, the Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing discovery, including
the numerous California depositions. The Plaintiff appealed that decision but because it
was not a final order, the appeal was dismissed on December 15,1998. Therefore, because
of a dismissed appeal, a six month time period elapsed because of the timing of the
appellate courts. When the trial court was finally able to enter a finalized order granting
the June, 1998 motion for summary judgment, which order was entered on March 31,
2000, the Plaintiff again sought an appeal in April, 2000. Again, because of the timing of
the appellate process, this case was not ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court until April
26, 2002, and remitted to the trial court in May, 2002. Because of a successful appeal, the
Plaintiffs case was delayed for over two years. The time elapsed during these two appeals
processes, over two and a half years, should not be characterized as the Plaintiffs fault in
further delaying the prosecution of this case. What is only before this Court is the nearly
one year period of time from July, 2002 to August, 2003; any other period of delay cannot
be attributed to the Plaintiff.
Utah case law has demonstrated that the time period for delay regarding a dismissal
of a case for failure to prosecute is a much larger length of time than the mere one year in
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this matter. Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247,461 P.2d 464 (1969) (a
period of five and a half years), Grundman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah
1984) (a period of four years), Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dept. of
Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (a period of five years), and Crystal Lime &
Cement Co.v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (a period over eight years).
The period where this matter has sat idle is merely one year and has not been a sufficient
time whereby the trial court could have found that the Plaintiff has failed to prosecute her
claims.
B. The prejudice to the Defendant by the Plaintiffs one year delay.
The fourth Maxfield factor which this Court must consider is what prejudice may
have been caused to the Defendants by the Plaintiffs one year delay.

See also

Westinghouse, 544 P.2d 876 . A federal court, interpreting the corresponding federal rule,
has held that a dismissal for failure to prosecute would be improper when the defendant
made no claim of prejudice by the delay. Ford v. Sharp. 758 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir.
1985).
In the present case, the Defendants never claimed nor provided any evidence to the
trial court that they were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs one year delay. The Defendants
argue that "Defendant is a corporation and many of the witnesses who were present prior
to the first appeal in 1998, have sought other employment in the intervening six years."
(Brief of Appellees, p. 29). However, the Defendants never provided any evidence of its
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employees seeking other employment in the intervening six years. This Court does not
have any evidence before it that the Defendants were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs one year
delay—indeed, an examination of both the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute do not contain any evidence of prejudice.
(R. 1755-1760, 1781-1784). Since there is no evidence of prejudice to the Defendants
before this Court, this Court must conclude that there is no prejudice to the Defendant as
a result of the one year delay.
C. Injustice will result from the dismissal of the Plaintiffs case.
The final, and most important Maxfield factor is whether injustice may result from
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims. Maxfield. 779 P.2d at 239. The Plaintiff has
diligently prosecuted her case for several years, conducting extensive written discovery,
taking numerous depositions of the Defendants' out of state employees, filing and
opposing motions for summary judgment, as well as availing herself of her right to appeal.
This case has been ongoing for several years, whereby the Plaintiff has been prosecuting
her claim during most of that time; the Plaintiffs claims should not be so summarily
dismissed for the lapse of a short period of time, after such extensive discovery and
successfully appealing a motion for summary judgment against her. Such action would
be inherently unfair and serve as a great injustice to Plaintiff by not allowing her to bring
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her claims before the trial court, after such an exhaustive discovery phase and successful
appellate litigation.
II.

Plaintiffs Argument is Not Frivolous Within the Meaning of Ut. R.
App. P. 40 and Sanctions are Inappropriate.

Defendants' contend that Plaintiffs argument on appeal is subject to sanctions by
this Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(a), because Plaintiffs
argument nhinges exclusively on her factual assertion that under applicable Utah case law,
such a dismissal was improper where there was a pending counterclaim..." (Brief of
Appellees, at 33). Defendants seek sanctions, specifically attorney's fees, for having to
respond to such an argument when the Defendants dismissed their counterclaim before the
Plaintiffs appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in 2000. However, as argued above, even
with the Defendants' counterclaim dismissed, the trial court abuse its discretion in
dismissing the Plaintiffs claims for failure to prosecute where the Plaintiffs delay was
only a one year period in an action which has been ongoing since 1996 and which has been
at the appellate level for over two and a half years (not including this appeal) and where
no evidence of prejudice was presented by the Defendants. Under Rule 40(a), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure 33, is referenced, which allows this Court to award damages for
the presentation of a frivolous appeal. 'Frivolous' is defined as "one that is not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law." Ut. R. App. P. 33(b). As demonstrated by the Plaintiffs
arguments, her appeal of the trial court's dismissal of her claims for failure to prosecute
6
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are adequately grounded in fact, even without the additional fact of the Defendants'
counterclaim, and warranted by existing law.
As to the Defendants' contention that the Plaintiffs Docketing Statement contained
an error as to the number of appeals in this case, Plaintiffs counsel recognizes and admits
that the Docketing Statement failed to state the first appeal in this case, which was
dismissed on December 15, 1998 as a not originating from a final, appealable order.
However, the Defendants argue that had Plaintiff reviewed the 2000 Docketing Statement,
Plaintiff would have discovered the first appeal. An examination of the 2000 Docketing
Statement states that there are "no prior or related appeals." Therefore, a review of the
2000 Docketing Statement would not have discovered the prior appeal as Defendants
contend. Additionally, case law interpreting the requirement of a Docketing Statement,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, have held that without any prejudice alleged to be
suffered by a party for an untimely filing of a docketing statement, a dismissal for failure
to follow the requirements are discretionary with the appellate Court. Gorostieta v.

\

Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.2d 1110. The same reasoning could be extended to the
incorrect listing of prior appeals—absent any real prejudice to be suffered by the
i

Defendants, there is actually no harm because the fact of the first appeal has been brought
to the Court's attention.
Utah courts have held that sanctions for frivolous appeals:
should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However,
4
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sanctions should be imposed when *an appeal is obviously without any
merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower court;
increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of
the Law Court/
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) citing Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v.
Day, 438 A.2d 234,239 (Me. 1981). The facts of this case do not constitute an egregious
case, is taken with substantial merit and has a reasonable likelihood of success.
Additionally, Utah court decisions which have awarded sanctions for frivolous appeals
have demonstrated, by their particular facts, to be most egregious: Porco, 752 P.2d 365,
(plaintiffs apparent harassment of defendant through repeatedly bringing civil actions and
forcing her to pay substantial court costs and attorney fees) and Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003
UT 11, 67 P.3d 1000 (plaintiffs history of numerous frivolous litigation). Surely,
Plaintiffs case does not fail within such parameters of awarding sanctions and
Defendants' claims for such damages are inappropriate and should not be allowed by this
Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court determine
that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the Plaintiffs case for a failure to
prosecute for a one year time period and reverse the trial court's January 7, 2004 Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice.
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Additionally, Plaintiffs argument on appeal is presented without an attempt to
delay nor is it frivolous and Defendants' claims for appropriate sanctions should not be
allowed.
DATED this

q&day of September, 2004.
ROBINSON, SEILER& GLAZIER. LC

RyanuA. Peel
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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